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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)  
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 18, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-065.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 18, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr. Siemon and General Poznikhir, the U.S. side gave the Russian side the U.S. official translation of the Russian-proposed Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty, Telemetric Information, dated February 18, 2010. The Russian side presented its proposal for three sections of Part Seven which included: Section I. General Provisions; Section II. Access to Telemetric Information; and Section III. Guidance for the Exchange of Telemetric Exchange. The Russian side indicated its Protocol required five new definitions: launch, telemetric information, recording media, encryption and payload. The Russian side envisioned four Annexes to its Protocol: Annex 1 on the Provisions for the Use and Exchange of Media and Interpretive Data; Annex 2 on the

Organization and Conduct of Exhibitions of Recording Media and Playback Equipment; Annex 3 on Procedures for the Provision of Telemetric Information, Playback Equipment and Spare Parts; and Annex 4 on Training of Technical Personnel on the Operation and Maintenance of Playback Equipment. Six notifications would be required to implement the Russian proposal: (1) notification of the need to change the amount and volume of telemetric information exchanged or to notify the other Party of the date of suspension of the exchange of telemetric information; (2) notification for the acquisition and provision of playback equipment and spare parts; (3) notification of the intent to conduct an exhibition of playback equipment; (4) notification containing the arrangement and organization of training of technical personnel; (5) notification of incomplete or low quality recording media or incomplete interpretive data; and (6) notification providing clarification regarding incomplete or low quality recording media or incomplete interpretive data.

14. (S) The tone of the discussion was substantially different from previous telemetry meetings and the text offered promise for the future negotiation of telemetry provisions. However, the provisions in the Russian proposal still contained three fundamental differences between the U.S. and Russian positions. The first was the retention of the Russian position that the exchange would be suspended if the Parties could not agree on the need to change the terms of the exchange during the annual telemetry review. The Russian side indicated there might be flexibility on this issue if the United States agreed to the Russian-proposed joint statement on not using telemetry to enhance missile defense. The second involved a minimal role for the

receiving side in determining the flight tests in which telemetry would be exchanged. The current Russian position would provide for an expanded discussion in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)--a change from its previous position. The third difference was the exclusion from the exchange of telemetric information and interpretative data for the self-contained dispensing mechanism. End summary.

15. (U) Subject Summary: U.S. Official Translation; Sections Within Part Seven; Four Annexes; Proposed Notifications; Terms and Definitions; Initial Reaction; Section I. General Provisions; Section II. Access to Telemetric Information; Section III. Guidance for the Exchange of Telemetric Information.

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u.s. official translation  
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16. (S) Siemon provided Poznikhir the U.S. official translation of the Russian-proposed Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty, Telemetric Information, dated February 18, 2010, and turned the meeting over to Poznikhir to discuss the Russian proposal for Part Seven.

Begin text:

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

February 18, 2010

SFO-VIII

Confidential

Document of the Russian side

February 18, 2010

## Part Seven - Telemetric Information

### Section 1. General Provisions

1. The Parties shall exchange telemetric information on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but on no more than five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs per calendar year.

2. The launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, on which telemetric information is provided, shall be determined by the conducting Party.

3. Telemetric information shall be exchanged on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted in the previous calendar year. The number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, about which telemetric information is exchanged, shall be agreed upon at the first annual session of the BCC of the current year.

4. Each Party shall provide telemetric information to the other Party via diplomatic channels no later than 30 days after a decision regarding this issue has been made by the BCC.

5. The conditions and guideline for the exchange of telemetric information on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be considered within the framework of the BCC.

In the event that one of the Parties raises a question concerning the need to change the quantity and amount of telemetric information transferred, the exchange of telemetric information shall be suspended until the Parties reach an agreement on the given change.

6. Telemetric information shall not be exchanged during the calendar year in which the Treaty expires.

### Section II. Access to telemetric information

1. The Party conducting launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, on which telemetric information is provided, shall not take any measures to deny access to telemetric information broadcast, including encryption, jamming, encapsulation, and use of directional beaming.

2. In relation to launches of ICBMs and SLBMs on which telemetric information is not exchanged, each Party shall have the right to

use any method of denying access to telemetric information which originates on board the missile and is broadcast. The Party conducting the launch shall notify the other Party, in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol, of the intention to take measures to deny access to telemetric information.

### Section III. Guideline for the exchange of telemetric information

¶1. In the exchange of telemetric information, the Parties shall provide the recording media containing the recording of telemetric information broadcast during the launch, until the propulsion unit of the upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs ceases to function, as well as the interpretive data for the telemetric information provided, in accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol.

¶2. The Parties shall not exchange telemetric information broadcast after the propulsion unit of the upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs ceases to function, as well as telemetric information that originated in (a) re-entry vehicle (s) or in other equipment, installed in the missile as payload.

¶3. During each launch of ICBMs or SLBMs the Party, conducting the launch, shall not broadcast telemetric information via a re-entry vehicle pertaining to the function of stages of ICBMs or SLBMs.

¶4. The Party conducting a launch shall independently determine the method for recording telemetric information on recording media.

¶5. Each Party, in order to make it possible for the other Party to play back the recording of the telemetric information provided, shall:

a) use those types of modulation, methods, modes and formats for recording, as well as methods for encoding telemetric information on recording media that will enable the conversion of the telemetric information to the form (format) originated on board the missile before broadcast, using telemetry playback equipment for which a demonstration has been conducted;

b) conduct an initial demonstration of the applicable recording media and telemetry playback equipment to be used, in accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol;

c) conduct demonstrations of the recording media and (or) telemetry playback equipment that are different from those for which a demonstration has been previously conducted, in accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol;

d) provide the other Party with the opportunity to acquire the telemetry playback equipment and spare parts for such equipment, in

accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol;

e) provide timely training in the operation and maintenance of the telemetry playback equipment to technical personnel of the other Party, in accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol;

¶6. If a Party that has received the media containing the recording of telemetric information, determines that the media does not contain the recording of the telemetric information in the amount specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Part, or that the quality of the telemetric information recorded on the media is insufficient to convert it to the form (format) originated on board the missile before broadcast, that Party shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol. No later than 30 days after receiving such notification, the Party that has provided the media containing the recording of the telemetric information, shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol explaining the reasons for the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the recording of telemetric information, or shall provide via diplomatic channels new media containing the recording of telemetric information.

¶7. If a Party that has received the interpretative data for the telemetric information provided, determines that such data does not meet the requirements set forth in the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol, or that the data received is insufficient to convert the recorded telemetric information to the form (format) originated on board the missile before broadcast, that Party shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol. No later than 30 days after receiving such notification, the Party that has provided the interpretative data for the telemetric information shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol specifying the procedure for using the interpretative data for telemetric information previously provided, or shall provide via diplomatic channels the revised interpretative data for telemetric information.

End text.

¶7. (S) Poznikhir remarked that after four sessions he believed the sides were at the same place where they began negotiations on telemetry. Since the U.S. side had not provided a proposal on telemetry, the Russian side took the initiative to draft a proposal. The Russian side believed its proposal was fully based on the fundamentals agreed by President Medvedev and President Obama as well as the agreements reached during the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow. The Russian side believed telemetry should be reflected in the Treaty, Protocol and Annexes. Russia believed the two sides agreed on this approach, and since the text of Article X was agreed with the exception of one bracket, the sides could discuss the Protocol and Annexes.

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Sections within part seven  
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¶8. (S) Poznikhir stated that the Russian-proposed Part Seven to the Protocol included three sections: Section I. General Provisions; Section II. Access to Telemetric Information; and Section III. Guideline for the Exchange of Telemetric Information. Section I contained information on the number of launches on which telemetric information would be exchanged as well as the selection process. Section II contained the right of the Parties to limit access to telemetric information. Section III contained the procedures for the exchange of recording media, exhibitions and purchase of playback equipment and spare parts. He asked Siemon if

he had an objection to this structure to which Siemon replied that he had considered a similar structure for Part Seven and the subordinate Annexes.

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Four Annexes  
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¶9. (S) Poznikhir indicated that the Russian side envisioned four Annexes to Part Seven. Annex 1 contained provisions for the use and exchange of recording media and interpretive data. He believed this Annex could contain a description of recording media, its format and procedures for its exchange. The Annex could also include procedures for the provision and structure of interpretive data describing the telemetric information on the recording media. Annex 2 contained arrangements for the demonstration of recording media and playback equipment, including an initial demonstration. Procedures for subsequent demonstrations would be included for the situation where a Party changed the recording media or playback equipment it used. Poznikhir believed the sides would discuss the procedures for the initial demonstrations in the BCC and the demonstrations could be conducted 180 days after the discussions. Annex 3 contained the procedures for acquisition of playback equipment and spare parts. The Annex would also contain cost settlement procedures. Annex 4 contained procedures for training of personnel on the operation and maintenance of the playback equipment. This annex could also contain procedures for cost settlement for such training. Poznikhir said that the sides might determine the need for other annexes while working with these documents.

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proposed notifications  
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¶10. (S) The Russian side envisioned six notifications in Part IV of the Protocol used to implement the provisions of Part Seven and its Annexes: (1) notification of the need to change the amount and volume of telemetric information exchanged or to notify the other Party of the date of suspension of the exchange of telemetric information; (2) notification for the acquisition and provision of playback equipment and spare parts; (3) notification of the intent to conduct a demonstration of playback equipment, including an initial demonstration; (4) notification containing the arrangement and organization of training of technical personnel; (5) notification of incomplete or low quality recording media or incomplete interpretive data; and (6) notification providing clarification regarding incomplete or low quality recording media or incomplete interpretive data. Poznikhir believed there was no need for a notification on the intent to use encryption for a particular launch since this could be included as remarks in the launch notification for ICBMs and SLBMs.

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terms and definitions  
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¶11. (S) Poznikhir indicated that five new terms and definitions were required to implement the Russian proposal. The five terms were: launch, telemetric information, recording media, encryption and payload.

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initial reaction  
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¶12. (S) Siemon stated his initial reaction to the Russian proposal was positive. He was impressed with the comprehensiveness of the Russian approach and also with the short time that it had taken to draft the proposal. The proposal paralleled what he believed the U.S. proposal would be and also the concepts that existed in START; specifically the proposed Annexes. Siemon noted the Russian proposal continued to differ from the U.S. position in the same areas that were previously discussed in the Working Group. There were three fundamental differences between the U.S. and Russian positions. The first was the retention of a Russian position that would suspend the exchange of telemetry if the Parties could not agree on changes during the annual telemetry review. Poznikhir indicated there might be flexibility on this issue if the United States could agree to the Russian-proposed joint statement prohibiting the use of telemetry to enhance missile defense. Siemon continued that the second difference involved a minimal role for the receiving side in determining the flight tests for which telemetry would be exchanged; however, he noted the Russian position did provide for an expansion of BCC discussions. The third difference was the exclusion of telemetric information and interpretative data for the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

¶13. (S) Poznikhir called attention to the fact that the structure of the Russian proposed Annexes and notifications was similar to the structure in START. He said the Russian side recognized the need to incorporate experience gained in START and believed details from the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) Agreements should be reflected in the Annexes.

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section I. general provisions  
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¶14. (S) Poznikhir continued with a paragraph-by-paragraph review of the proposed Part Seven. Paragraph 1 of Section I contained the words "equal number" to reflect the Russian fundamental concept of parity. Paragraph 2 contained the right of the conducting Party to determine on which launches telemetric information would be exchanged. Poznikhir reminded the U.S. side that simply exchanging telemetry was a compromise as the result of a President Medvedev decision, and this condition for the exchange was a redline. In Paragraph 3, the Russian side had added text referencing agreement within the BCC to resolve a concern of the U.S. side on the use of "treaty year" versus "calendar year." Poznikhir emphasized that using treaty year was not acceptable to the Russian side. Paragraph 5 reflected agreements made during the Mullen-Makarov meetings and the concept of suspension in the case of suspected use of telemetry for building missile defense systems. This text heavily depended on the outcome of the Russian-proposed Joint Statement on Missile Defense.

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section II. Access to telemetric information  
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¶15. (S) Poznikhir noted that Paragraph 1 of Section II provided for transparency in that it prohibited data denial measures for launches on which telemetric information was exchanged to ensure transparency for those launches. He also noted that national technical means (NTM) could be used to confirm if data denial measures had been used on a launch and to confirm that the telemetric information was accurate. Paragraph 2 permitted the use of data denial measures on all launches except for the "no more than five launches" on which telemetric information would be exchanged. In those cases where encryption was used, the Party conducting the launch would notify the other Party. Siemon said that this was helpful.

¶16. (S) Mr. Dean asked a question about how Section I and Section II interacted. In Section I, the Russian proposal stated that

Parties met in January to discuss which of the previous year's launches telemetry would be exchanged. However, in Section II, the Russian proposal stated that on a launch-by-launch basis, Russia would or would not encrypt a particular launch depending on whether that launch was one for which telemetry would be provided. Essentially, Section I made it look like the Parties decided on the previous year's launches, but Section II made it look like the Parties decided for each launch whether it would be exchanged.

¶17. (S) Poznikhir explained that Russia would indeed make a decision on each particular launch. In the following January the sides would meet and discuss which of those launches were to be exchanged. This meant that the sides would know, as launches were being conducted, which launches the other side intended to discuss in the BCC the following January as candidate launches for telemetry exchange.

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section III. Guidance for the  
exchange of Telemetric Information  
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¶18. (S) Poznikhir stated that Paragraphs 1 and 2 reflected the Russian position that telemetry and interpretive data would not be provided for the self-contained dispensing mechanism or for a reentry vehicle or other payload. Paragraphs 3 and 4 contained provisions that were used in START. Paragraph 5 required that playback provide telemetry in the same format as was originated on board the missile before it was broadcast. Paragraph 6 provided for situations where incomplete telemetric information or telemetric information of insufficient quality had been provided. Paragraph 7 provided similar provisions for interpretive data.

¶19. (S) Siemon and Dean asked questions to clarify whether Paragraph 6 of Section I meant that telemetry would not be exchanged during the last year of the treaty for launches in the previous year or, rather, if the text just meant that there would not be a telemetry exchange in the January after the treaty went out of force. Poznikhir confirmed that if the Treaty went into force in 2010, then in 2020, the sides would exchange telemetry for launches in 2019, but not for launches in 2020.

¶20. (S) Lt Col Goodman gave an example that demonstrated that the Russian proposal on "no more than five launches" could be interpreted in such a way that the Parties could avoid providing



telemetry entirely. He asked what language prevented a Party from encrypting all of its launches. Poznikhir acknowledged this and stated that further discussion of this issue was required. Ms. Pura provided an example in which the use of encryption and cancellation of scheduled launches due to force majeure could result in a situation where only encrypted launches occurred during the year. She asked if the Russian Side was prepared to exchange

encrypted telemetry and the required interpretive data. Poznikhir indicated this was a possibility, but after consulting with his side he withdrew his response and stated that this would have to be discussed in the BCC. Dr. Ringenberg commented that telemetry existed in several locations and in several formats on board the missile; in the transducers, computer, and in the telemetry system. Did the provisions contained in paragraph 5 of Section III require that a Party provide the formats for telemetry as it existed prior to broadcast in the format used to transmit the telemetry to the ground station? CAPT Second Rank Lyzsovskiy answered that a Party must provide all frame formats for telemetry as they existed in the transmitter on board the missile before broadcast. The Russian side required this information to avoid playback problems encountered in START. He provided an example where the United States used a modulation technique called FQPSK (Feher's-patented Quadrature Phase Shift Keying) in order to get high rate, telemetric information to the ground.

¶21. (S) Siemon noted the meeting had been the most productive thus far. He reiterated the three fundamental differences between the U.S. and Russian positions. He stated that while there was a difference about which text the sides believed should be in Part Seven and in the Annexes, he agreed in concept that the provisions the Russian side proposed to put in Part Seven and in the Annexes reflected concepts that needed to be covered. Poznikhir reminded Siemon that Russia's fundamental points had not changed. The Russian delegation would still follow its guidance on Russia's redlines.

¶22. (U) Documents provided:

- United States:

-- U.S. Official Translation of the Russian-Proposed Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty - Telemetric Information, dated February 18, 2010.

¶23. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Siemon

Mr. Dean

Lt Col Goodman

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Ms. Pura

Dr. Ringenberg

Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Poznikhir

Ms. Fuzhenkova

CAPT (2nd rank) Lyzsovskiy

Col Kamenskiy

Mr. Shevchenko

Mr. Voloskov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)

124. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
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